Classification of Polymorphic Virus Based on Integrated Features

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Abstract—Standard virus classification relies on the use of virus function, which is a small number of bytes written in assembly language. The addressable problem with current malware intrusion detection and prevention system is having difficulties in detecting unknown and multipath polymorphic computer virus solely based on either static or dynamic features. Thus, this paper presents a classification of polymorphic virus based on integrated features. The integrated feature is selected based on Information Gain rank value between static and dynamic features. Then, all datasets are tested on Naïve Bayes and Random Forest classifiers. We extracted 49 features from 700 polymorphic computer virus samples from Netherland Net Lab and VXHeaven, which includes benign and polymorphic virus function. We spilled dataset based on 60% for training and 40% for testing. The performance metric of accuracy value, receiver operating characteristic and mean absolute error are compared between two algorithms in the experiment of static, dynamic and integrated features. Our proposed integrated features manage to achieve 98.5% of accuracy value using the highest rank feature selection.

Keywords- classification; polymorphic virus; integrated features; naïve bayes classifiers; random forest classifiers.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Internet has become an essential thing in life, and it is expected to overgrow. However, this left all connected computers susceptible to misuse and abuse. Recently, there has been a remarkable growth in a number of malware as well. Once the computer is online, anyone can have access to the network. So, intruders can attack the networks easily. Hence, malicious software attacks have become a common problem in recent years. Malware is a program or file that can damage a computer and collect computer user's information without permission that includes computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses and spyware. Malware Computer virus is a malware that replicates by reproducing itself or infecting other programs by modifying them during execution. Infecting computer programs can include data files or the boot sector of the hard drive.

A computer virus can be categorized into an encrypted, metamorphic and polymorphic virus. Each computer virus has to be classified accordingly for better intrusion detection and prevention system. Thus, classification of computer virus has highly significance in the anti-virus industry. Computer virus classification has drawn many considerations from many researchers. Several good classification techniques such as signature-based [1]–[3] and behavior based [4]–[7] have been developed to address the polymorphic computer virus problems. However, some new malware samples keep on increasing despite escalating growth of anti-malware services and technologies [8], [9], [17].

Generally, established virus detection utilizes virus function, in which it is a sequence of bytes in the machine code. This research is conducted focusing on polymorphic virus signature based on static, dynamic and integrated features. The behavior of the signature is analyzed using machine learning approaches, which are Random Forest and Naïve Bayes algorithms. To analyze the polymorphic virus signature, 49 of distinct static and dynamic features of raw data collected and experimented. Features of polymorphic computer virus are ranked into Highest Rank, Lowest Rank, Medium Rank, and Random Rank by using Information Gain (IG) value. The performance metric of accuracy value, Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) and mean absolute error are compared between two algorithms in the experiment of static, dynamic and integrated features. This study aims to propose an integrated feature for polymorphic virus classification to improve the accuracy rate, reduce error rate with good ROC value.

A. Related Works

A polymorphic virus can mutate its code and to make a new signature generation. Most of the computer users are not aware of the malware attacks. This is because the computer virus never gives a hint when it will attack. Therefore, it is essential to predict computer viruses attacks.

A polymorphic computer virus can be grouped into either static or dynamic features. It is difficult to analyze the polymorphic computer virus by using either static or dynamic features because the multipath polymorphic computer virus has both features. Therefore, the classification of polymorphic computer virus based on integrated features will have a significant contribution to the anti-virus industry.

B. Malware Classification

Malware classification can be grouped into two techniques that are anomaly-based and signature-based. Anomaly-based classification technique uses standard Android behavior information during instruction inspection to make a decision either the application is malicious or not. The specification-based is a particular type of anomalybased classification. Specification-based techniques decide the maliciousness of a program through intrusion inspection that depends on rule set of valid behavior.

Any programs that breach the specification are supposed to be anomalous and malicious. The effective signaturebased approach relies on the signature of malicious behavior.

TABLE I THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF STATIC AND DYNAMIC

| | Advantage | Disadvantage |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------|
| Specification- | Fast and safe | Difficulty in |
| based (Static | Low level of | analyzing unknown |
| analysis) | false positives. | malware. |
| Signature-based | Good in detecting | The difficulty is |
| (Dynamic | unknown malware | analyzing multipath |
| analysis) | | malware. |

Each of the classification techniques can employ one of three different approaches, which are static, dynamic, or integrated. Table 1 shows the advantages and disadvantages of dynamic and static analysis. To overcome the limitation of an existing method, the integrated approach is proposed in this research.

C. Previous Work on Classification Techniques

This section examines the present static feature work and the dynamic feature research. There are other classify malware based on a machine learning approach [22], [23]. Work by Leder et al. [12] proposed a classification of metamorphic variants based on static features. Usually, the virus scanner overlooks Metamorphic malware because of its ability to modify the code and structure consistently throughout infection. This work uses a small number of malware samples based on a static analysis technique.

Ye et al. [13] presented a classifier based on an analysis of API execution calls. They test a large collection dataset tat consists of 35,000 and 15,000 malware and cleanware samples respectively. They executed the Android malware analysis by various data mining techniques and managed to achieve 88% accuracy.

Work by [14] developed an integrated system called ISMCS that made of feature exactor, malware categorizer using weighted subspace clustering method and malware signature generator modules. ISMCS categorized 2029 malware from 407 families. Their method uses IDA Pro Disassembler to extract function call. The experimental results show that the ISMCS system outperforms K-Means and hierarchical clustering algorithms which are closed to 79% accuracy.

Islam, Tian, Batten and Versteeg [11], [18], [19], proposed a tool that detects mobile self-encrypting and polymorphic viruses. Traditional pattern matching techniques cannot detect these types of viruses as they are designed to circumvent pattern matching techniques. This tool is allowed to decrypt itself in an emulator of the Operating System. Their framework combines the static features of function length and printable string information extracted from malware samples into a single test to classify the malware. They input 1400 unpacked malware sample along with 151 clean files using k-fold cross-validation. Their work achieved an accuracy of over 98%.

Generally, there are current works which use a behavioral analysis approach to classify the malware. In [20], the authors propose a behavior-based automated classification method based on behavioral analysis profile. The report contains the status change caused by executable and event transferred from Win32API calls and other parameters. The feature vectors consist of 13000 malware sample which is input to the SVM. They can classify with an average accuracy of 83.3%.

Work by [21] develops a behavioral model based on attribute-grammars, including semantic attributes and rules which has two layers. The first layer interprets the collected instructions, API calls, and arguments and classifies these operations as well as the involved objects according to their purpose in the malware lifecycle. The second detection layer remains generic and is interoperable between the different abstraction components. They tested about 200 samples of Portable Executable (PE) malware, 200 samples of Visual Basic Script malware and 50 clean files. This technique only achieved 51% accuracy of PE malware. However, it performed much better on Visual Basic scripts with 89% accuracy rate.

Our work differs than previous works in such a way that, we proposed an integrated approach which considered Function Length Pattern (FLP), Printable String Information (PSI) and Application Programming Interfaces (API) features. Then, we improved the feature matrix using Information Gain (IG) algorithm to assess the feature value in classifying malware. The dataset was then tested using Naïve Bayes and Random Forest based on Accuracy Rate, Error rate, Receiver Operating Characteristic. These algorithms are the simplest and most commonly used classification methods. Random Forest can deal with unbalanced and missing data while Naïve Bayes performs well when we have multiple classes and working with text classification.

II. MATERIAL AND METHOD

In this section, we discuss the proposed classification of polymorphic virus based on integrated features. We will first introduce the classification model, feature selection and extraction process

A. Virus Classification Model

Figure 1 shows the polymorphic virus classification model. We use 700 raw data collected from Netherland Net Lab [3] and VXHeaven [16]. We consider three types of features: 26 Function Length Pattern (FLP), 11 Printable String Information (PSI) and 12 Application Programming Interfaces (API). These features had been ranked into Highest_Rank, Lowest_Rank, Medium_Rank, and Random_Rank by using Information Gain (IG) value. The IG algorithm is used to make a decision which attributes in a given set of training feature vectors is most important for discriminating between the classes to be learned. Consider the dataset represented by a feature vector, F in the form of $(x, y) = (x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n, y)$ where $x_a \in val(a)$ is the value of a^{th} attribute of feature vector x and y is the corresponding class label.

We rank the features into various types to evaluate the performance of the selected features based on the level of importance. Then, we split the data into 60:40 ratios for training and testing data respectively. Training data is used for implemented to build up a model. Testing data is used to validating the model built. Next, each ranked features are classified using Naïve Bayes and Random Forest classifiers via WEKA tools.




Fig. 1: Polymorphic Virus Classification Model

B. Feature Selection and Extraction

In the feature selection process, the selected features are extracted from a polymorphic virus that has been extorted in .xml file format. The next step in the process is to generate components of a feature vector by analyzing the database. Table 2 shows the description of 26 Function Length Pattern (FLP), Table 3 portrays 11 Printable String Information (PSI) and Table 4 depicts 12 Application Programming Interfaces (API) that used in the experiment. Then, the integrated feature is selected based on the rank value calculated using Information Gain (IG) algorithm.

 TABLE II

 FUNCTION LENGTH PATTERN (FLP) FEATURES

| Num | String | Description | |
|-----|--------------------|--|--|
| 1 | LoadLibraryW | Loads the specified module into the address space of the calling process | |
| 2 | HeapAlloc | A handle to the heap from which the memory allocated. This handle is returned by the HeapCreate or | |
| | | GetProcessHeap function. | |
| 3 | HeapFree | Frees a memory block | |
| 4 | NtOpenKey | Opens the specified registry key | |
| 5 | GetProcAddress | Retrieves the address of an exported function or variable from the specified dynamic-link library | |
| 6 | RegOpenKeyExW | Opens the specified registry key | |
| 7 | ISBadReadPtr | Verifies that the calling process has read access to the specified range of memory. | |
| 8 | CId | Security Identifiers. A security identifier (SID) is a unique value of variable length used to identify a trustee. | |
| 9 | LocalAlloc | Allocates fixed memory. The return value is a pointer to the memory object. | |
| 10 | GetCurrentProcess | Retrieves a pseudo handle for the current process | |
| 11 | GetCurrentThread | Retrieves the thread identifier of the calling thread. | |
| 12 | NtQueryValueKey | If the lpValueName registry value does not exist, RegQueryValueEx returns ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND | |
| 13 | ISBadWritePtr | This function is obsolete and should not be used. that the memory pointed to is safe to use | |
| 14 | RegDeleteValueA | Removes a named value from the specified registry key | |
| 15 | RegOpenKeyA | Does not create the specified key if the key does not exist in the | |
| 16 | GetModuleHandleA | Returns a handle to a mapped module without incrementing | |
| 17 | RegQueryValueExA | When calling the RegQueryValueEx function with hKey set to the HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA | |
| 18 | Socket | Make a socket that is bound to a specific transport service provider. | |
| 19 | ntohS | Change a u_short from TCP/IP network byte order to host byte order (which is little-endian on Intel processors). | |
| 20 | Sleep | Suspends the execution of the current thread until the time-out interval elapses. To enter an alert able wait | |
| | | state, use the SleepEx function. | |
| 21 | FindFirStFileA | Opens a search handle and returns information about the first | |
| 22 | FindCloSe | Closes a file search handle opened by the FindFirstFile, FindFirstFileEx, FindFirstFileNameW, | |
| | | FindFirstFileNameTransactedW | |
| 23 | GetModuleFileName | Does not retrieve the path for modules that were loaded | |
| | А | | |
| 24 | GetFileAttributeSA | GetFileAttributesA(ANSI) See also DeviceIoControl File Attribute Constants File Management Functions | |
| 25 | CreateFileA | Produce a handle to a communications resource. | |
| 26 | ReadFile | Parameters hFile [in] A handle to the device (for example, a file, file stream, physical disk, volume, console | |
| | | buffer, tape drive, socket, communications resource | |

| Num | String | Description |
|-----|---------------|--|
| 1 | RegSetValueEx | If the lpValueName registry value does |
| | Α | not exist, RegQueryValueEx returns |
| | | ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND |
| 2 | RegSetValueEx | Sets the data and type of a specified |
| | W | value under a registry |
| 3 | GetDriveTypeA | Determines whether a disk drive is a removable |
| 4 | RegOpenKeyEx | This handle is returned by the |
| | А | RegCreateKeyEx or RegOpenKeyEx |
| | | function |
| 5 | ShellExecuteA | Operates on a specified file. |
| 6 | cloSeK | Closes a handle to the specified registry |
| | | key. |
| 7 | GetFileSize | Will get the file type |
| 8 | WinExec | The function returns when the started |
| | | process calls the GetMessage function, |
| | | or a time-out limit is reached. |
| 9 | GetProceSSVer | Retrieves timing information for the |
| | Sion | specified process. |
| 10 | RegDeleteKeyA | Deletes a subkey and its values from |
| | | the specified platform-specific view of |
| | | the registry. |
| 11 | RegCreateKeyE | Creates all missing keys in the specified |
| | xA | path. |

TABLE III PRINTABLE STRING INFORMATION (PSI) FEATURES

 TABLE IV

 Application Programming Interface (API) Features

| Num | String | Description |
|-----|--------------------|---|
| 1 | FindNextFileA | Continues a file search from a previous call to |
| 2 | inet_addr | The inet_addr function converts a string containing an IPv4 |
| 3 | connect | Enables you to provide feedback directly to the team's |
| 4 | SetFilePointer | This function stores the file pointer in two LONG values |
| 5 | WriteFile | may fail with an error |
| 6 | HeapCreate | Creates a private heap object |
| 7 | SetThreadPriority | Sets the priority value |
| 8 | CreateProceSSA | Fails if the total size of the environment |
| 9 | GetModuleHandleW | Returns a handle to a mapped module |
| 10 | GlobalAlloc | Parameters uFlags |
| 11 | recv | to read incoming data |
| 12 | SetFileAttributeSA | Sets the attributes for a file or directory |

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

In this section, Classification of Polymorphic virus based on integrated features selected from static and dynamic features has been done.

A. Experimental Setup

This research constructed three types of experiments which the features had been ranked into Highest_Rank, Lowest_Rank, Medium_Rank, and Random_Rank by using Information Gain (IG) value. Next, each ranked features are tested using Naïve Bayes [15] and Random Forest classifiers. Then, the performance metric for both classification algorithm are compared regarding accuracy rate, receiver operating characteristic, and mean absolute error.

In Experiment 1 (static features), 37 static features of the polymorphic computer virus have been ranked from various features group as Function Length Pattern (FLP) and Printable String Information (PSI) as shown in Table 5 and 6. Table 5 shows the IG value for 26 static features specifically the Function Length Pattern (FLP) features. The "LoadLibraryW" feature has the highest IG value that is 0.49620. Meanwhile, the "GetFileAttributes," "CreateFileA" and "ReadFile" have the lowest IG value of 0.00000. Highest value shows the features are the most relevant features to be applied in the experiment with the lowest redundant and high robustness characteristics. Table 6 shows that "RegSetValueExA" feature has the highest IG value as compared to 10 other features selected.

In Experiment 2 (dynamic features), 12 dynamic features from Application Programming Interface (API) group features have been ranked based on IG value as shown in Table 7. Feature "FindNextFileA" is the most significant features with IG value of 0.32489. The least IG value is "recv" and "SetFileAttributeSA" which is 0.0000.

In Experiment 3 (integrated features), the three best features are selected from each type of feature: Function Length Pattern (static), Printable String Information (static) and Application Programming Interfaces (dynamic). Table 8 shows the combination of features for each type of feature rank: Highest_Rank, Medium_Rank Random_Rank, and Lowest_Rank. The performance metric for each experiment was compared between both classifiers. In order to ensure that the accuracy and effectiveness of the experiments, all types of feature rank are using the same split ratio size for training and testing which is 60:40 respectively.

 TABLE V

 Information Gain (IG) Ranking Filter for flp (Static Features)

| Ranking | Information Gain Value | Features |
|---------|------------------------|--------------------|
| 1 | 0.49620 | LoadLibraryW |
| 2 | 0.46478 | HeapAlloc |
| 3 | 0.32489 | HeapFree |
| 4 | 0.28996 | NtOpenKey |
| 5 | 0.23310 | GetProcAddress |
| 6 | 0.18640 | RegOpenKeyExW |
| 7 | 0.18430 | ISBadReadPtr |
| 8 | 0.17200 | Cid |
| 9 | 0.16556 | LocalAlloc |
| 10 | 0.15520 | GetCurrentProcess |
| 11 | 0.09080 | GetCurrentThreadId |
| 12 | 0.08766 | NtQueryValueKey |
| 13 | 0.06984 | ISBadWritePtr |
| 14 | 0.04630 | RegDeleteValueA |
| 15 | 0.04281 | RegOpenKeyExA |
| 16 | 0.02750 | GetModuleHandleA |
| 17 | 0.02490 | RegQueryValueExA |
| 18 | 0.02287 | socket |
| 19 | 0.01750 | ntohs |
| 20 | 0.01437 | Sleep |
| 21 | 0.00613 | FindFirstFileA |
| 22 | 0.00552 | FindClose |
| 23 | 0.00401 | GetModuleFileNameW |
| 24 | 0.00000 | GetFileAttributesA |
| 25 | 0.00000 | CreateFileA |
| 26 | 0.00000 | ReadFile |

| Ranking | Information Gain Value | Features |
|---------|------------------------|-------------------|
| 1 | 0.72780 | RegSetValueExA |
| 2 | 0.51842 | RegSetValueExW |
| 3 | 0.49902 | GetDriveTypeA |
| 4 | 0.15956 | RegOpenKeyExA |
| 5 | 0.12433 | ShellExecuteA |
| 6 | 0.08710 | cloSeK |
| 7 | 0.03078 | GetFileSize |
| 8 | 0.01619 | WinExec |
| 9 | 0.00625 | GetProceSSVerSion |
| 10 | 0.00000 | RegDeleteKeyA |
| 11 | 0.00000 | RegCreateKeyExA |

TABLE VI INFORMATION GAIN (IG) RANKING FILTER FOR PSI (STATIC FEATURES)

TABLE VII INFORMATION GAIN (IG) RANKING FILTER FOR API (DYNAMIC FEATURES)

| Ranking | Information Gain Value | Features |
|---------|------------------------|--------------------|
| 1 | 0.32489 | FindNextFileA |
| 2 | 0.28996 | inet_addr |
| 3 | 0.23310 | connect |
| 4 | 0.18640 | SetFilePointer |
| 5 | 0.18430 | WriteFile |
| 6 | 0.17200 | HeapCreate |
| 7 | 0.15520 | SetThreadPriority |
| 8 | 0.12433 | CreateProceSSA |
| 9 | 0.09080 | GetModuleHandleW |
| 10 | 0.08766 | GlobalAlloc |
| 11 | 0.00000 | recv |
| 12 | 0.00000 | SetFileAttributeSA |

TABLE VIII INTEGRATED RANKED FEATURES

| Dataset | Feature | Туре |
|--------------|--------------------|------|
| | GetFileAttributesA | FLP |
| | CreateFileA | FLP |
| | ReadFile | FLP |
| | GetProceSSVerSion | PSI |
| Lowest Rank | RegDeleteKeyA | PSI |
| | RegCreateKeyExA | PSI |
| | GlobalAlloc | API |
| | recv | API |
| | SetFileAttributeSA | API |
| | RegOpenKeyExW | FLP |
| | ISBadReadPtr | FLP |
| | Cid | FLP |
| | RegOpenKeyExA | PSI |
| Medium_Rank | ShellExecuteA | PSI |
| | cloSeK | PSI |
| | SetFilePointer | API |
| | WriteFile | API |
| | HeapCreate | API |
| | LoadLibraryW | FLP |
| | HeapAlloc | FLP |
| | HeapFree | FLP |
| | RegSetValueExA | PSI |
| Highest_Rank | RegSetValueExW | PSI |
| | GetDriveTypeA | PSI |
| | FindNextFileA | API |
| | inet_addr | API |
| | connect | API |
| | LocalAlloc | FLP |
| | GetCurrentProcess | FLP |
| | GetCurrentThreadId | FLP |
| | GetFileSize | PSI |
| Random_Rank | WinExec | PSI |
| | RegOpenKeyExA | PSI |
| | SetFilePointer | API |
| | WriteFile | API |
| | HeapCreate | API |

B. Performance Metric

In order to measure the effectiveness of integrated features for the classification approach, we refer to three possible outcomes as Accuracy, Receiver Operation Curve (ROC) and Mean Absolute Error. The performance metric for accuracy is defined as,

$$Accuracy = \frac{Number of correct prediction}{Total number of prediction}$$
.

Equivalently, the performance of the classification model can be expressed in term of its error rate, which given by,

$$Error \ rate = \frac{Number \ of \ wrong \ prediction}{Total \ number \ of \ prediction}.$$

Next, the ROC figure is a curve graphically displaying the transaction involving sensitivity and specificity for each cutoff value. It gives you an idea about weighted average values of two classes of malware. The ROC value is used to evaluate the effectiveness of malware classes in all experiments. The best class prediction will have larger ROC values.

C. Result and Discussion

In the experiment, the performance metric of Accuracy, Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) and Mean Absolute Error are discussed.




Fig. 2. Classification accuracy for Experiment 1 (static features)




Fig. 3. Classification accuracy for Experiment 2 (dynamic features)

1) Accuracy value: The accuracy value for all set of feature rank based on static features in Experiment 1 setup is depicted in Figure 2. Highest_Rank feature selection achieved the highest accuracy which is 98.5% classified using Random Forest algorithm. Figure 3 shows the accurate result for dynamically based features on Experiment 2 setup. Both algorithms, Naïve Bayes and Random Forest, achieved the highest accuracy when tested on Random_Rank feature.

Figure 4 shows the accuracy value for all sets of feature rank based on integrated features in Experiment 3. The Random_Rank feature achieved the highest accuracy which is 99.7% which classified using Random Forest algorithm. Moreover, the Random Forest algorithm also managed to classify the Lowest_Rank feature up to 95.13% accuracy value. This proves that Random Forest presents reliable and clear enhancement in accuracy mainly for many class classifications. Moreover, Random Forest algorithm gives better result against overfitting issue.




Fig. 4. Classification accuracy for Experiment 3 (integrated features)

2) Mean Absolute Error Value: Figure 5, 6 and 7 show the mean absolute error for experiment 1, 2 and three based on static, dynamic and integrated approach respectively. The Lowest_Rank feature has the highest error, which is 0.57 when tested using Random Forest classification algorithm and 0.63 using Naïve Bayes algorithm respectively as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 6 portrays the mean absolute error for dynamic classification method. Lowest_Rank feature has the highest mean absolute error which is 0.42 for Naïve Bayes classification algorithm and 0.401 for Random Forest classification algorithm.

Based on Figure 7, the Lowest_Rank feature has the highest error, which is 0.57 and 0.63 when tested using the Random Forest algorithm and Naïve Bayes algorithm respectively. This shows that the Lowest_Rank feature selection has the least significance features for virus classification used for all experiments.




Fig. 5. Mean Absolute Error value for Experiment 1 (static features)




Fig. 6. Mean Absolute Error value for Experiment 2 (dynamic features)




Fig. 7. Mean Absolute Error value for Experiment 3(integrated features)

3) Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) value: Figure 8, 9 and 10 shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) for all experiment setup. The best ROC value is when it is near one. Figure 8 shows that the Random_Rank features have the highest value which is 0.998 and 0.849 when tested on the Random Forest algorithm and Naïve Bayes classification algorithm respectively. While Figure 9 shows the Random_Rank features also has the highest ROC value for both algorithms which is 0.9 for Naïve Bayes and 0.995 for the Random Forest algorithm. Figure 10 shows the Random_Rank feature recorded the highest ROC value which was 0.936 and 0.964 for Naïve Bayes and Random Forest classification algorithm respectively.




Fig. 8. Receiver Operation Curve (ROC) for static features




Fig. 9. Receiver Operation Curve (ROC) for dynamic features




Fig.10. Receiver Operation Curve (ROC) for integrated features

IV. CONCLUSION

The experiment conducted between static features, dynamic features and integrated features on the various ranking group (Lowest_Rank, Medium Rank, Highest_Rank, and Random_Rank). The Random Forest algorithm is the best classification algorithm because of it achieved high accuracy result, low means absolute error and high ROC value as compare to Naïve Bayes classifier for the most dataset. Our proposed integrated features show the promising result when tested on the various ranking group regarding accuracy; low means absolute error and high ROC value as compared to static and dynamic features. This shows that the selected integrated feature contribute well for virus classification and the given set of training feature vectors is most important for discriminating between the classes to be learned.

We plan to explore the integrated features to improve polymorphic computer virus classification. For instance, future work has to use an optimal number of features. This may reveal the information on processing time and also the effectiveness of the system since good features can affect the performance of the classifier. Thus, the integrated mechanism can update the classifier when notice new possible features in real time

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