











An attacker can send a malicious signal at any instance. Suppose that the attacker decides to send  $k=20$  malicious signals at different instances. Assume that the IDS is set to perform  $m=15$  checks during the interval. Our goal is to calculate the probability that IDS detects  $x=4$  malicious signals. We perform 10,000 experiments where each experiment consists of 1000 simulated runs.

The histogram of the resulting probabilities is presented in Fig. 5. For the reference, we calculate the theoretical probability  $p(4)$  using Equation 1. As shown in Fig. 5, the histogram is centered symmetrically around the theoretical probability.




Fig. 5 A numerical simulation with a total of  $10^7$  runs. The parameters of the simulation are  $n=100$ ,  $m=15$ ,  $k=20$ , and  $x=4$ . The value  $\mu = 0.2$  is the theoretical probability obtained from Equation 1

In addition, we calculated the expected number of detected attacks in the same scenario as above using the direct approach and Equation 3. Using the direct approach, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} E[X] &= \sum_{x=0}^k x \cdot \frac{\binom{k}{x} \binom{n-k}{m-x}}{\binom{n}{m}} \\ &= \sum_x x \cdot \frac{\binom{20}{x} \binom{80}{15-x}}{\binom{100}{15}} \\ &= 3 \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

A more efficient approach to calculate the expected number of attacks is given by us in Equation 1:

$$E[X] = \frac{k \cdot m}{n} = \frac{20 \cdot 15}{100} = 3 \quad (12)$$

It follows from the above comparisons that the direct approach and the one provided by us yield the same results. We observe that the experimental results support the theoretical findings from the previous section.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

The widespread adoption of network-based technologies has increased the potential for damage caused by a malicious attack on a network. Both the frequency and the severity of network attacks have risen over the past decade. As a result, it has become essential to develop effective intrusion detection systems. In this paper, we provide a probabilistic framework to analyze the detection rate of malicious attacks. We carried out careful theoretical and experimental analyses of the research problem. We developed the formula for calculating the intrusion detection rate for a fixed set of

parameters. Given an interval of time that is divided into discrete instances at which the attacks can occur we can calculate the probability of IDS detecting  $x$  attacks via Equation 1. In addition, the expected number of detected attacks is also calculated via Equation 3. The theoretical results were tested and validated through numerical experiments. The outcome of the experiments confirmed the original theoretical results. We note that even with a simple strategy such as uniform sampling the probability of detecting at least one malicious attack is high given a small number of checks: the intrusion detection rate is nearly 0.9 when checking only 15% of time instances. The detection rate reaches 1 when checking 30% of time instances.

We believe that the probabilistic framework developed in this paper would be of use to IDS experts. For a network-based IDS that is checking the incoming packets in real time the computational cost of analyzing the entire traffic flow can be prohibitively expensive. So, checking only a probabilistically sampled fraction of the network traffic would allow the IDS to handle its task. However, checking only a fraction of the traffic introduces a probability of missing an attack. We hope to provide a better understanding of the likelihood of detecting an attack by an IDS and improve the design of the system. In practical terms, the results of this paper help IDS designers achieve appropriate detection rates while maintaining a low false alarm rate.

The groundwork that has been laid out in this paper can be used for future research into understanding of the probabilities related to intrusion detection. We believe that there are multiple avenues for future research that stem from the present work. The key assumption of our study is the uniform distribution of attacks and checks. However, it does not cover all the intrusion scenarios. It would be necessary to address other attack and detection patterns in future research.

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